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Abstract and Keywords
This article reexamines the sources of exclusivity for drugs, considers their limitations,
and evaluates exclusivity under the new biologics legislation in light of these limitations.
The current overlapping legal protections for exclusivity in the pharmaceutical
marketplace reflect a series of political compromises, repeatedly renegotiated to correct
for unintended consequences in the previous version of the rules. Patents and patent
challenges play a central role in this system of protection, and many of the patents at
stake are ultimately held invalid in litigation. It is not easy to untangle a complex legal
regime that allocates billions of dollars of profits. But it makes little sense for lawmakers
and trade negotiators to extend this Byzantine system into new legal regimes, either by
duplicating the Hatch–Waxman Act for biosimilars or by binding US trading partners to
adopt similar systems in their national laws. A simpler and more effective legal regime
would rely less on patent protection and more on well-designed regulatory exclusivity to
support incentives for new drug development.
Keywords: drug exclusivity, patents, patent challenges, Hatch–Waxman Act, drug policy, biosimilars, regulation

Pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) involves both the creation of new
products and the production of information about their effects through preclinical
research and clinical trials. Firms might underinvest in this costly, risky, and timeconsuming R&D in the absence of subsidies, rewards, or protection from competition.
This chapter examines and critiques the patent and regulatory regimes that offer drug
developers temporary shelter from competition. The principal focus is on US law, with
some attention to different rules that prevail in the European Union (EU).
The patent system works in tandem with drug regulation to defer market entry by
competitors, thereby preserving profitable exclusivity in the market for a new drug more
effectively than patents could do without the regulatory assist (Eisenberg 2007). Under
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the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act (FDCA),1 the US Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) requires the submission of data showing safety and efficacy before it approves new
drugs for sale. This entry barrier both adds to the costs of drug development and protects
drug developers from competition. At least since passage of the Orphan Drug Act of
19832 and the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
(commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act),3 Congress has deliberately deployed
regulatory entry (p. 168) barriers to shelter research performers from competition. The
Hatch-Waxman Act charged the FDA with administering periods of regulatory exclusivity
before it allows generic competitors to use a less costly Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA). These periods turn in part on the terms of any relevant patents, and
patent terms turn in part on extensions to compensate for regulatory lags in product
approval. Patents and drug regulation are pervasively intertwined in the Hatch-Waxman
scheme, creating considerable complexity and uncertainty.
The regulatory regime governing most biotechnology products until quite recently has
been different. The FDA generally regulates these products as “biologics” under the
Public Health Service Act (PHSA)4 rather than as drugs under the FDCA.5 The
biotechnology industry was in its infancy when the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed in
1984, and that Act did not create a corresponding abbreviated approval pathway for
biologics under the PHSA. Generics manufacturers had only limited success in using the
Hatch-Waxman provisions to gain approval for generic versions of biologic products (Dinh
2007). Twenty-six years after the Hatch-Waxman Act, the U.S. Congress enacted an
abbreviated approval process for products that are “biosimilar” to previously approved
biologic products, on somewhat different terms than those available for generic drugs
under the Hatch-Waxman Act.6
This chapter reexamines the sources of exclusivity for drugs, considers their limitations,
and evaluates exclusivity under the new biologics legislation in light of these limitations.

Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Products
and Methods
Although biopharmaceutical innovation is often counted as a success story for the patent
system (Bessen and Meurer 2008), many of the patents that drug companies rely on for
exclusivity ultimately prove vulnerable to validity challenges brought by generic
competitors. Such challenges have become increasingly common and (p. 169) arise ever
earlier in the commercial life of pharmaceutical products as firms have responded to
incentives in the Hatch-Waxman Act (Grabowski and Kyle 2007), triggering judicial
scrutiny that many patents have been unable to withstand. The vulnerability of so many
pharmaceutical patents to validity challenges calls into question how well patent doctrine
works in this particular context (Roin 2009).
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The Asynchrony of Patents and Drug Development
Under U.S. law,7 in order to be patentable an invention must be new,8 useful,9 and
nonobvious.10 The inventor must file a patent application that provides a written
description of the invention and enables a person skilled in the field to make and use it.11
Failure to satisfy these requirements may lead to rejection of a patent application12 or to
later invalidation of an issued patent.13
The patent claims that are most effective at securing exclusivity are those that cover the
drug molecule as a new composition of matter. But the invention of new molecules occurs
at an early stage in the course of drug development, before therapeutic value is validated
in clinical trials. Patent law promotes early filing on these inventions to minimize the risk
that publication or public use will make them ineligible for patenting, but at that stage
much work remains to be done before the molecules may be approved for commercial
sale. The FDA estimates that it takes on average 8½ years to study and test a new drug
before the FDA can approve it for sale to the public (FDA 2006); industry estimates are
even higher, ranging from 10 to 15 years (Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of
America [PhRMA] 2007). This time lag can pose challenges for patent seekers. In the
early stages of (p. 170) drug development, researchers may not know enough about new
molecules to meet requirements for patent protection. Moreover, patents with early filing
dates have early expiration dates. Later-filed patents, on the other hand, are more
constrained by prior art and thus more likely to be either invalid or too narrow to provide
meaningful exclusionary rights.

Patenting in the Early Stages of R&D
There are many reasons for innovating firms to seek patent protection as early as
possible. The issuance of a patent promises future protection against competitors, making
it easier to profit from developing inventions into commercial products. Without this
promise, firms are usually unwilling to incur the costs of clinical trials. Firms evaluate
drug candidates for patentability early and drop candidates that they cannot patent. New
firms may be unable to attract investment capital to pursue clinical trials without patent
protection (Roin 2009).
Patent law promotes early filing on new inventions because patentability depends on how
an invention compares to the “prior art,” including publications, patents, and public
knowledge or use.14 If the prior art discloses an invention or makes it obvious, it may not
be patented. The later a patent application is filed, the more extensive the prior art. An
inventor's own publications, published patent applications, or public use constitute prior
art that may prevent later patenting of the disclosed work or of obvious variations.15 It
may become necessary to claim an invention narrowly in order to distinguish it from the
prior art. For example, if the prior art discloses one form of the active ingredient in a
drug, that disclosure will make it impossible to obtain a broad patent claim that would
cover many variations on that active ingredient (such as different salt forms or hydrates).
A narrower claim limited to a newly identified variation, use, or formulation might still be
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allowable if it is not obvious in light of the prior art. But these narrower patents, even if
valid, may be easier for competitors to avoid infringing. Earlier filed patent applications,
because they face less prior art, qualify for broader claims and therefore offer more
effective protection against competition.
Despite the commercial and doctrinal advantages of early filing, the time lag between the
discovery of a new molecule and the development of information necessary to use that
molecule as a drug may make early filing difficult.
First, without some research into the properties of a molecule, it may be difficult to
satisfy the “utility” and “enabling disclosure” requirements. The patent (p. 171) statute
limits protection to inventions that are “useful,”16 and requires patent applicants to
disclose their inventions “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art … to make and use the same.”17 The US Supreme Court has held
that it is not enough to show that as of the filing date the invention is an object of “usetesting.”18 Subsequent lower court decisions have generally found promising in vitro test
results adequate to demonstrate patentable utility,19 but in some cases courts have
required clinical testing to support controversial claims of therapeutic utility.20 Delays in
patent filing to gather data to establish utility may lead to future rejection for lack of
novelty if, in the interim, the molecule itself has been published or otherwise disclosed.
For example, if an early patent application that discloses a new molecule is published 18
months after its filing date,21 it becomes prior art even if the application is rejected for
failure to meet the utility requirement (Roin 2009). Once the molecule is in the prior art,
an inventor who later finds a use for it may no longer patent the molecule itself, although
it may be possible to get a narrower patent on a method of use. But a patent that claims
only a method of use is of limited value because it will not prevent others from making,
using, or selling the same molecule for other uses.
Second, if a new drug is structurally similar to a prior art molecule, further research may
be necessary to satisfy the nonobviousness requirement. The courts and the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) have developed a distinct approach for evaluating the
nonobviousness of chemicals created by making small changes in prior art molecules.22
Under this approach the existence of a structurally similar molecule in the prior art
makes the new variation prima facie obvious. The patent applicant may rebut prima facie
obviousness with evidence of surprising properties (or particularly advantageous
properties) not present in the prior art.23 To make this showing, it may be necessary to
perform tests on both the new chemical and the prior art chemical. If the obviousness
challenge does not arise until after the product has been thoroughly tested, the patent
holder may use studies performed after the patent filing to show surprising or
advantageous properties.24 But if the (p. 172) PTO rejects the application at the outset for
prima facie obviousness, the need to develop rebuttal evidence may cause delays.
Meanwhile, firms might hesitate to invest in costly testing without the promise of
patentability.
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The “surprising properties” narrative aligns poorly with the nature and timing of risktaking in drug development. Some surprising properties of new chemicals are
immediately apparent upon synthesis. But the most important properties of drugs—safety
and efficacy for therapeutic purposes—require validation through testing and observation
over time. Drug development involves focused searches for desirable properties more
often than serendipitous surprises. Firms typically select for further testing those
molecules that they most expect to succeed, although most molecules ultimately
disappoint early expectations. In the face of high hopes, surprising properties are more
likely to be bad news than good news; in that case patentability may be a dubious
consolation prize rather than a valuable incentive. A rule that promises patent protection
only after testing reveals surprising properties may thus fail to motivate investments in
clinical trials of promising candidates to confirm hoped-for properties.
When patentability is delayed by the need to do studies to prove utility or to show
surprising properties, investments in drug development become more risky. Intervening
prior art may force patent applicants to abandon or, more likely, to narrow their claims,
making it easier for competitors to enter the market in the future if the product is
successful. If commercially effective patent protection seems fraught with uncertainty, a
firm may drop a product from further development.
The effects of uncertain patent rights may be mitigated somewhat by the increasing
presence in early-stage biopharmaceutical R&D of biotechnology firms that have a higher
tolerance for risk than traditional pharmaceutical firms. These firms may be willing to
continue pursuing early-stage research projects that risk-averse pharmaceutical firms
would abandon (Lou and deRond 2006), making it less likely that valuable products will
die on the vine. Later, after further research reduces the risk that these products will fail,
pharmaceutical firms might be willing to in-license the products to shepherd them
through clinical trials and market launch (Mayhew 2010). Weakness in the patent position
supporting these products will diminish their value to licensees or other investors, but
perhaps further research will have yielded additional patents.

Limitations on Patents Available in Later Stages of R&D
Successful drugs are typically covered by multiple patents, with new applications filed
throughout the product life cycle (Furrow 2008). Firms have tried different patent
strategies to prolong exclusivity in a successful drug, including patenting drug
metabolites, patenting a single enantiomer isolated from a racemic mixture (Agranat and
Wainschtein 2010), and patenting new dosage forms or combination products. Many of
these patents have been challenged by generic competitors, often successfully. The most
significant obstacles to patenting follow-on inventions are novelty and nonobviousness.
Follow-on patents violate the novelty standard if they cover products and
methods that are in the prior art, either explicitly or inherently. This rule makes broad
patent claims in follow-on patents invalid. For example, in Schering v Geneva,25 the
patent at issue claimed descarboethoxyloratadine (DCL), a metabolite of loratadine. The
prior art included an expired patent on loratadine. Schering sought to enforce the DCL
(p. 173)
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patent against the sale of generic loratadine by arguing that patients who ingested
loratadine would necessarily produce DCL in their guts, thereby infringing the DCL
patent. The court held the DCL patent invalid, reasoning that if, as both parties agreed,
administering loratadine to patients inherently causes the production of DCL, DCL
became prior art when the earlier loratadine patent disclosed administering loratadine to
patients. A narrower claim to the metabolite in isolated form might have survived this
challenge, but such a claim would not preclude competitors from selling loratadine.
Patents claiming modest changes that are sufficient to avoid a novelty challenge have
often been held invalid for obviousness, including claims to new dosages,26 new
formulations,27 combination products that package the drug with another familiar
ingredient in a single capsule,28 and single enantiomers or diastereomers isolated from a
racemate or other mixture of stereoisomers.29 To avoid invalidation for obviousness, the
patent holder must show either that a person working in the field would not have found
the modification obvious or that the modified version has surprising properties not
present in the prior art. This has proved to be a significant obstacle for many follow-on
patents (Eisenberg 2008).

Patent Duration and Term Extension
The term of a patent aligns poorly with the economic life cycle of a drug. Although firms
file for patents in the early stages of drug development, patents confer little competitive
advantage before a product is on the market. Most uses of drugs during the premarket
stage fall within the Hatch-Waxman exemption from infringement for the use of a
patented drug “solely for uses reasonably related to the submission of information under
a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use or sale (p. 174) of drugs. …”30 The
US Supreme Court has interpreted this exemption to cover not only clinical trials and
bioequivalence studies but also preclinical laboratory research.31 This leaves little room
for enforcement of patents against competitors in the premarket stage.
By the time a drug gets to market, some early-filed patents may have little remaining life.
Today, most patents expire 20 years after their filing date.32 This term has long been
standard throughout the world, but the United States did not adopt a 20-year patent term
until 1994,33 when it amended its patent laws to comply with the multilateral Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, known as the TRIPS
Agreement.34 Before that time, US patents expired 17 years after the date of issuance,
and patents issued on US applications filed before June 8, 1995 still get the benefit of this
expiration date if it is later than 20 years after the filing date.35 The 17-year term is
advantageous for patent applications that are pending for longer than three years; the
longer the pendency, the greater the advantage.
Patent applicants who filed before the 1995 transition date can potentially gain
commercial advantage by using continuations36 and prosecution delays to keep their
applications pending for years, relying on early filing dates to limit exposure to prior art
while deferring their patent terms until they need protection from competition. Although
the number of patents that can take advantage of this transitional provision is
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diminishing, some patent applicants continue to use it.37 An important limitation on this
strategy is the judicial doctrine of “double-patenting,” which prevents an applicant from
obtaining multiple successive patent terms on (p. 175) the same invention or on obvious
variations thereon.38 If the second patent is not “patentably distinct” from the first, it
requires a “terminal disclaimer” that causes it to expire at the same time as the first
patent.39 This complex doctrine should diminish in importance with the gradual
disappearance of patent filings eligible for the 17-year term, but because of the
substantial values at stake it continues to be the focus of considerable litigation in the
pharmaceutical industry.40
A patent on an FDA-approved drug may be entitled to a term extension of up to five years
to compensate for some of the time lost during clinical trials and regulatory review.41 The
remaining patent life after extension may not exceed 14 years beyond the date of FDA
approval.42 The period of extension includes one-half of the time spent in clinical trials
and all of the time between submission and approval of the NDA.43 Both periods are
reduced by any time attributable to an applicant's lack of diligence.44 Only the first
approval of a new active ingredient qualifies for a patent term extension, and only one
patent may be extended per new active ingredient.45 The patent to be extended must be
in force on the date of approval46 and must cover either the product, a method of using
the product, or a method of manufacturing the product.47
These provisions present a firm with a strategic dilemma: should it extend an early-filed
patent that expires sooner but is more likely to survive a validity challenge, or a follow-on
patent that potentially confers more years of exclusivity but is narrower and more
vulnerable to patent-defeating prior art? Sometimes follow-on patents are all that
remain.48 With generic firms racing to challenge vulnerable patents, the risks and stakes
are high.

(p. 176)

Patents and the Timing of Generic Approval

The Hatch-Waxman Act fundamentally altered drug patent enforcement in the United
States. Before Hatch-Waxman, generic versions of previously approved drugs faced two
major entry barriers: first, the FDA approval process, which generally required the same
showing of safety and efficacy for a generic product as for a pioneering drug,49 and
second, patents, which private owners could enforce through infringement actions in the
courts.50 The FDA entry barrier was usually sufficient to defer generic entry long after
relevant patents had expired, because the costs of clinical trials were prohibitive for
generic products that would be sold at competitive prices (Mossinghoff 1999). The HatchWaxman Act lowered the regulatory entry barrier considerably by allowing approval of a
generic product that is “bioequivalent” to a previously approved product under an ANDA,
without requiring duplication of safety and efficacy trials.51 At the same time, it fortified
the patent entry barrier by creating a system within the FDA for tracking drug patents
and deferring the availability of ANDAs during the patent term. The Hatch-Waxman Act
set up a complex process, fraught with unintended consequences, to divert disputed
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patent issues to the courts and to motivate potential competitors to challenge the validity
of patents. Patent challenges have become increasingly common and are frequently
successful, exposing weaknesses in the patent system for drugs.

Patents at the FDA
The FDCA requires that an NDA disclose any patent that claims the drug or a method of
using the drug “with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be
asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of
the drug.”52 On approval of the NDA, the FDA (p. 177) publishes this information,
updated to include later patents, in a publication called “the Orange Book,” which is
available on the FDA website.53 This information determines the timing of FDA approval
of ANDAs under an intricate set of rules.
The statute requires that an ANDA include one of four prescribed “certifications” with
respect to each patent in the Orange Book for the previously approved “listed drug”54: a
“paragraph I certification” indicating that no patent information has been filed; a
“paragraph II certification” indicating that the patent has expired; a “paragraph III
certification” indicating the date on which the patent will expire; or a “paragraph IV
certification” indicating “that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted.”55 If
there are no relevant patents still in force, the ANDA may be approved without further
delay,56 assuming it is otherwise approvable.57 If a patent is still in force, the ANDA may
be approved upon its expiration date.58 The consequences of a paragraph IV certification
are complex.
An applicant making a paragraph IV certification must give notice within 20 days to each
owner of the patent and to the holder of the approved NDA including “a detailed
statement of the factual and legal basis of the opinion of the applicant that the patent is
invalid or will not be infringed.”59 The ANDA may then be approved immediately, unless
an action for patent infringement is brought within 45 days. The filing of a patent
infringement action triggers a 30-month stay of approval of the ANDA, subject to
adjustment by the court.60 The first firm to file an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification
for a listed drug gets a 180-day head start before the FDA will approve another ANDA
with a paragraph IV certification for the same product.61 These provisions have been
litigated extensively as firms have explored their strategic implications.
One effect of the Hatch-Waxman Act has been to shift some of the burden of patent
enforcement from patent owners to the FDA by directing the FDA to refrain from
approving ANDAs during the patent term. In the absence of a paragraph IV certification,
the FDA will use its gatekeeper role to exclude competitors until (p. 178) the patents
listed in the Orange Book expire, without the need for infringement litigation. Patent
holders need not monitor competitors to detect infringement; the burden is on firms
seeking to enter the market to address infringement of listed patents when they file
ANDAs. Even when an ANDA filer challenges the patent in a paragraph IV certification, a
patent holder who brings an infringement action gets an automatic 30-month stay of
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approval of the ANDA, without having to meet judicial standards for a preliminary
injunction.62 These features of the statute fortify the exclusionary effect of patents
outside the courts through the use of heightened regulatory entry barriers during the
patent term.
To be sure, these provisions only defer the use of ANDAs; they do not prevent a
competitor willing to conduct its own clinical trials from submitting a full NDA, nor do
they prevent the FDA from approving such an NDA, even during the patent term. So long
as NDA requirements are cost-prohibitive for generics, however, the FDA-administered
remedy of deferring the use of ANDAs is at least as effective in deferring competition as
judicial remedies for patent infringement.
A distinct advantage for patent holders of the FDA-administered remedies is that, unlike a
court, the FDA makes no effort to determine whether patents listed in the Orange Book
are valid and infringed, or even whether they claim the listed drug or its use. FDA relies
on the NDA sponsor to identify which patents are appropriate for listing in the Orange
Book, and if anyone disputes the accuracy of the patent information or the propriety of
listing a particular patent, the FDA relies on the sponsor to decide whether to change the
listing or to leave it as is.63 FDA does not itself consider the merits of paragraph IV
certifications but simply defers approval of ANDAs for 30 months pending further
instructions from the courts. All listed patents get the same administrative treatment
regardless of their validity or scope.
For a while, 30-month stays appeared to be a potentially never-ending source of
exclusivity for NDA holders, so long as they could continually refresh their stock of
patents in the Orange Book and obtain additional 30-month stays for each new patent
(Federal Trade Commission [FTC] 2002). After the FTC documented this emerging
practice in a 2002 report, the FDA implemented a rule that (p. 179) had the practical
effect of limiting NDA holders to one 30-month stay per ANDA, regardless of the number
of listed patents and paragraph IV certifications (FDA 2003b). Congress promptly
endorsed this administrative policy with a somewhat different limitation as part of the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003,64 excluding
stays for patents added to the Orange Book after the ANDA filing date.65 Either way, the
effect is to limit the duration of the stay to a single period of 30 months.
The new statutory limitation makes it advantageous to file ANDAs with paragraph IV
certifications as soon as possible66 to run out the clock on the 30-month stay. The HatchWaxman Act also encourages prompt filing of paragraph IV certifications by rewarding
the first firm to file an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification for a listed drug with a
180-day period of “generic exclusivity” before FDA may approve another ANDA with a
paragraph IV certification for the same product.67 The result has been a race to file
ANDAs with paragraph IV certifications68 and an explosion of patent infringement
litigation at the ANDA stage.

ANDA Infringement Litigation
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ANDA infringement litigation allows the courts to resolve disputes about patent validity
and infringement prior to generic entry. It differs from ordinary infringement litigation in
ways that give the generic challenger greater control. Although the patent holder is
formally the plaintiff, it is the generic challenger that decides whether to provoke the
lawsuit by filing a paragraph IV certification. If the patent holder fails to file an
infringement action within 45 days, it forfeits the 30-month stay of approval of the ANDA,
risking immediate loss of market share to generic competition. Moreover, the generic
challenger may bring a declaratory judgment action to establish that the patent is invalid
or will not be infringed by the generic product.69 The generic challenger can also set the
terms of the litigation, both by selecting the patents to challenge and by defining the
accused product and method of treatment for which it seeks approval in its ANDA.
(p. 180)

The Hatch-Waxman Act altered the statutory definition of patent infringement to

allow both bioequivalence studies of generic drugs and adjudication of patent disputes to
occur before generic entry.70 Under the new definition, the filing of an ANDA “for a drug
claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent” is itself an act of
infringement, subjecting the ANDA filer to injunctive relief (but not damages) prior to the
sale of a commercial product.71 The focus of ANDA infringement analysis is the proposed
product and use for which the applicant seeks approval, rather than an actual commercial
product or use. The generic challenger may thus avoid liability by drafting the ANDA to
specify a composition that falls outside the scope of the patent claims72 or by limiting the
uses for which it seeks approval to avoid method of use claims.73 If the generic product
becomes commercially available during the patent term,74 the patent holder may bring
another infringement action for damages and injunction against the actual commercial
product, even if the hypothetical product for which the same firm sought approval in the
ANDA was held not to infringe in the course of the ANDA infringement action.75
Litigating patent disputes prior to generic entry benefits holders of valid patents by
forestalling competition, but it also minimizes risks for generic challengers by allowing
them to challenge patents before they expose themselves to liability for money damages
by launching an infringing commercial product.76

(p. 181)

Deferral of FDA approval is the

most significant remedy at stake in ANDA litigation.77
Typically the patent holder has much more at stake in ANDA litigation than the generic
challenger. If the patent holder prevails, the court will likely direct the FDA to defer
approval of the ANDA until the end of the patent term. Assuming no other ANDA filer
successfully challenges the patent,78 the patent holder could remain the sole source of
the drug for the remaining patent life, an outcome that could be worth billions of dollars
in the case of a blockbuster product. If the generic challenger prevails, its ANDA will be
approved, and if it was the first ANDA with a paragraph IV certification for that product,
it may be the only ANDA-approved generic on the market for 180 days. Because the first
generic competitor in the market for a drug typically charges higher prices and captures
a larger market share until a second generic competitor enters the market, this period of
generic exclusivity has significant value (Congressional Budget Office 1998). The value of
generic exclusivity is diminished if multiple ANDA filers share the exclusivity79 or if the
NDA holder decides to launch its own competing “authorized generic” during the generic
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exclusivity period (Thomas 2006).80 A 2009 FTC report on authorized generics stated
that, on average, expenditures at wholesale prices of a generic during the 180-day
exclusivity period equal 61 percent of expenditures on the brand name product during a
comparable period before generic entry (FTC 2009a). Once the generic exclusivity period
expires (p. 182) and more generic competitors enter, price competition is likely to reduce
profits considerably. Even with generic exclusivity, the profits that a generic challenger
hopes to gain in the patent challenge are likely to be a fraction of the profits the patent
holder hopes to preserve.
Given uncertainty as to the outcome and litigation costs, this gap between the value and
risks to the patent holder and to the generic challenger makes it tempting to try to reach
a settlement. Some settlement agreements have provoked antitrust scrutiny by providing
for “reverse payments” from the patent holder to the generic challenger in exchange for
agreement by the challenger to defer market entry (Hemphill 2009; FTC 2010). Before
the 2003 statutory amendments, these agreements could potentially preclude all generic
entry so long as any patents remained in the Orange Book for the listed drug. This is
because, under previous statutory provisions, the FDA could not approve subsequent
ANDAs with paragraph IV certifications until 180 days after either (1) the first
commercial marketing of the product by the first ANDA filer or (2) a court decision
holding the challenged patents invalid or not infringed (FTC 2002). Settlements could
prevent either of these triggers from occurring, thus postponing indefinitely the time
when competing ANDAs could be approved. The revised statute addressed this problem
with several different patches.81
The FTC, with the support of a number of antitrust scholars, sees most settlements that
involve reverse payments to defer generic entry as agreements in restraint of trade in
violation of the antitrust laws (Hovenkamp et al. 2003, 2004; O’Rourke and Brodley 2003;
Hovenkamp 2004; Leffler and Leffler 2004; FTC 2010). Although owners of valid patents
are entitled to exclude competitors from the market until the end of the patent term,
antitrust authorities may suspect that settlements with reverse payments signal weak
patent claims.82 But in the ANDA litigation context, the inference of a weak patent is not
as compelling as might first appear. Even a victorious patent holder could not recover
damages from a defendant that is not yet selling a product, and even an optimistic patent
holder would presumably give up some portion of expected profits in settlement to reduce
the risk of a litigation loss. One might therefore expect settlement of even strong patent
infringement claims to involve reverse payments. So far, most courts considering (p. 183)
the issue have rejected the antitrust claims,83 with the support of another group of
antitrust scholars (Crane 2002, 2004; Schildkraut 2004).
Congress has implemented reforms suggested by the FTC to minimize anticompetitive
abuses, including revisions to the 180-day exclusivity period,84 and has ensured
continuing antitrust oversight by requiring that ANDA litigation settlement agreements
be filed with the FTC and the Justice Department within 10 days of execution.85 The
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prospect of antitrust enforcement presumably reduces the expected value of settlements
and prolongs litigation.
This complex regime is clearly far from optimal. Current law reflects repeated
compromises to rebalance the interests of innovators and generic competitors as
Congress seeks to block abuses, with each legislative patch inevitably introducing a new
set of unintended consequences. It is complex and provokes costly litigation with
unpredictable results. An interesting side effect is that this system shines a bright judicial
spotlight on the patent portfolios of the pharmaceutical industry to reveal an
uncomfortable truth: many of the patents are invalid.

Regulatory Exclusivity for Drugs
Congress has repeatedly provided exclusive rights for pharmaceutical innovators outside
the patent system by controlling the timing of regulatory entry barriers. These rights
promote certain forms of R&D, such as the development of orphan drugs or new chemical
entities (NCEs) or the testing of approved drugs for new uses or for use in children. The
terms of protection vary. Sometimes regulatory exclusivity runs concurrently with patent
protection, and sometimes it extends beyond the patent term. Although shorter in
duration than patents, most forms of regulatory exclusivity are better synchronized than
patents at the front end with the timeline of drug development, deferring generic entry
while the product (p. 184) is earning money rather than running the meter before product
launch. When patent validity and infringement are contested and uncertain, regulatory
exclusivity provides a minimum period of exclusivity that is less vulnerable than patent
protection to challenge. Moreover, legislators enjoy greater latitude in designing
regulatory exclusivity provisions to meet the needs of the pharmaceutical marketplace,
unconstrained by the strictures of a one-size-fits-all patent system that applies essentially
the same rules to all fields of technology.

Orphan Drugs: Market Exclusivity
The Orphan Drug Act of 198386 is an early example of regulatory exclusivity, directing the
FDA to grant seven years of market exclusivity for products to treat rare diseases and
conditions affecting fewer than 200,000 patients in the United States.87 Available for both
drugs and biologics, Orphan Drug exclusivity does not merely defer the use of an ANDA.
It entirely prohibits approval of another application “for such drug for such disease or
condition” for seven years after the initial product approval, even if the later applicant
conducts its own clinical trials. It does not, however, preclude approval of either (1)
another drug for the same disease or condition, or (2) the same drug for another disease
or condition.88 The FDA has interpreted the statute to permit approval of a “clinically
superior” product that uses the “same active moiety.”89
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Market exclusivity under the Orphan Drug Act is similar to a patent on a particular use of
a drug, enforced by FDA, with the drug narrowly defined to exclude “clinically superior”
formulations. Although one might expect orphan drugs to have markets too small to be
lucrative, many products qualifying for Orphan Drug exclusivity have had large and
profitable markets (Pulsinelli 1999). The Orphan Drug Act may provide protection for new
uses of old drugs that were taken off the market and for which early patents have
expired, such as thalidomide (Perri and Hsu 2003). But because Orphan Drug exclusivity
does not extend to other uses for the same product, it is of little value for products that
competitors are free to sell for other previously approved indications.90

(p. 185)

Hatch-Waxman: Data Exclusivity

In 1984 Congress added two more provisions for regulatory exclusivity in the HatchWaxman Act, providing five years of data exclusivity for NCEs not previously approved by
the FDA91 and three years of data exclusivity for changes in a previously approved
product requiring new clinical trials to win supplemental NDA approval.92 In contrast to
the Orphan Drug Act provisions, these Hatch-Waxman Act provisions merely prevent
competitors from using an ANDA. They do not prevent a competitor willing to conduct its
own clinical trials from obtaining approval of its own NDA. In this sense, they resemble
FDA-administered proprietary rights in regulatory data, deferring the time when
competitors may rely on the innovator's prior showing of safety and efficacy, although the
practical effect is to defer generic competition. Sometimes the term “data exclusivity”
refers to periods of delay before an abbreviated approval pathway may be used, whereas
“market exclusivity” refers to a more robust form of exclusion such as that available
under the Orphan Drug Act; however, usage is not entirely consistent.

NCE Exclusivity
The period of exclusivity for an NCE begins with first market approval and therefore
often runs concurrently with patent protection, although in some cases it may last longer
(Junod 2004). Although it is sometimes referred to as “five-year exclusivity,” the effective
period of protection is usually longer than five years. During the statutory period, one
may not even submit an ANDA to the FDA; it takes an average of 19.2 months after
submission of an ANDA for the FDA to approve the drug for marketing, extending the
time before generic entry (FDA 2007). If the ANDA includes a paragraph IV certification,
it may be submitted as early as four years after approval of the NCE, but if the patent
holder brings an infringement action within the next year, the 30-month stay is extended
to give a total of 7½ years from initial NDA approval to the time of ANDA approval.93
With these qualifications, in practice the period of exclusivity from first approval of the
NCE until approval of an ANDA is likely to range from a minimum of 5½ years (if an
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification is filed after four years, no infringement action is
filed, and the FDA takes 1½ years to approve the ANDA) to a maximum of 7½ years (if an
infringement action is filed and the 30-month stay is extended in accordance with the
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statute), although approval times vary, and a court might lengthen or shorten the stay. In
the absence of patents, the period of exclusivity is five years plus approval time, or
approximately 6½ years.
Relatively few NDAs do not involve patents, but some involve invalid patents. NCE
exclusivity provides four years before such a product might face a (p. 186) patent
challenge and 7½ years before a patent challenger can enter the market under an ANDA.

Supplemental NDA Exclusivity
So-called “three-year exclusivity” arises when the FDA approves a supplement to a
previously approved NDA that required further clinical trials for approval.94
Supplemental NDAs are necessary to market a drug for a new indication, or in a different
dosage form or formulation, or to sell the drug over the counter (OTC) rather than by
prescription only. The three-year period begins with approval of the supplemental
application, making it advantageous to defer filing a supplemental NDA until other forms
of exclusivity are at an end in order to prolong the total period of exclusivity. As a product
approaches the end of its patent life, a firm might seek approval to switch from
prescription to OTC sales, thereby gaining three years before it faces generic competition
in the OTC market. The three-year period ends with ANDA approval, not with submission.
The FDA may not approve an ANDA for the same change during the exclusivity period,
but it may receive and review applications and grant tentative approval that becomes
effective when the exclusivity expires. The additional years of exclusivity are available
only if additional clinical trials were necessary to get the supplement approved.95
The exclusivity thereby gained is limited to the terms of the supplemental approval and
will not prevent a competitor from using an ANDA to get approval to sell the product as
previously approved. This is a significant limitation on the exclusive rights conferred by a
supplemental NDA to market a drug for a new indication.96 Three-year exclusivity does
not stop a generic competitor from getting approval to sell its product for the original
indication. Once the generic version is on the market, physicians are free to prescribe it
off-label for the new indication, and pharmacists may substitute the generic version
unless physicians expressly require that the originator brand be used. Indeed, unless the
new indication involves a different formulation of the product, state generic substitution
laws may require substitution of the cheaper generic product at the pharmacy
(Grabowski and Vernon 1979). A similar problem limits the value of both Orphan Drug
exclusivity and method-of-use patents for products with multiple therapeutic uses.
Three-year exclusivity remains commercially valuable in circumstances in which generic
substitution is unlikely, such as a prescription to OTC switch. If the branded product
becomes available OTC and the generic product is available only by prescription, patients
may switch to buying the branded product directly at the (p. 187) pharmacy rather than
seeing a doctor for a prescription. Three years of exclusivity in the OTC market may give
the branded product a dominant position with consumers that persists even after generic
entry in the OTC market (Mahecha 2006).
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A design flaw in three-year exclusivity is that, because it begins with approval of the
supplemental NDA, it is advantageous for firms to defer filing such supplements until
they are about to lose other exclusivity. Otherwise, the three-year period would run
concurrently with other protection without further deferring competition. The result may
be to lead firms to defer incremental innovation that could have occurred earlier.

Pediatric Exclusivity: Prolonging Existing Rights
The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 added six months of
exclusivity as a reward for conducting pediatric trials of drugs.97 This six-month period of
“pediatric exclusivity” is not contingent on approval of the drug for use in children and is
not limited to such use. The only requirements are that the FDA must request the
pediatric studies, and they must be completed and submitted within the timeframe
specified by the FDA.
In contrast to the Hatch-Waxman Act and Orphan Drug Act exclusivities, the six-month
pediatric exclusivity does not start running immediately on FDA approval. It simply
extends by six months the end dates of any existing forms of exclusivity held by the
submitter, whether under a patent, the Orphan Drug Act, or Hatch-Waxman Act
provisions,98 further deferring the time when the FDA might approve a competing generic
product. It does not run concurrently with other forms of exclusivity, and there is no
advantage to be gained by deferring pediatric trials. The provision is currently set to
expire in 2012,99 but Congress has repeatedly extended it and may do so again, although
in prior legislative debates some legislators suggested that six months of exclusivity is an
excessive reward for rather modest expenditures on pediatric trials (Steinbrook 2002).

(p. 188)

Regulatory Exclusivities in Other Countries

Longer periods of regulatory exclusivity are available in the EU, dating back to a time
when some members of the EU did not allow patents on pharmaceuticals (Junod 2004).100
The European regime currently provides for eight years of exclusivity before
authorization for a generic may be submitted and two further years before it may be
approved; each of these dates is extended by an additional year if, during the first eight
years, the holder of the authorization obtains further authorization for one or more new
therapeutic indications for the product.101 By disentangling the duration of exclusivity
from the timing of supplemental approval, the European approach encourages the testing
and submission for approval of new indications earlier in the life cycle of a drug relative
to the US approach.
The pharmaceutical industry has sought to establish regulatory exclusivity regimes
throughout the world in the terms of trade agreements, with mixed success (Reichman
2009; Fellmeth 2004). The multilateral TRIPS Agreement, in lieu of a proposed
requirement for a minimum of five years of regulatory exclusivity, ambiguously requires
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members of the World Trade Organization to protect undisclosed data against “unfair
commercial use” and against “disclosure, except where necessary to protect the
public.”102 Subsequent regional and bilateral free trade agreements more clearly specify
time periods during which national regulators may not approve generic drugs on the
basis of bioequivalence or otherwise rely on data provided by the originator (Reichman).

Regulatory Exclusivity for Biosimilars
The growing importance of regulatory exclusivity to the biopharmaceutical industry is
apparent from its role in legislation for the regulation of follow-on biologic products
(Higgins and Graham 2009; Schacht and Thomas 2009). A generation ago, Congress
provided for periods of regulatory exclusivity ranging from 4 to 7½ years in the HatchWaxman Act. Today, the biopharmaceutical industry has persuaded Congress to confer 12
years of regulatory exclusivity before the FDA can (p. 189) approve products that are
biosimilar to previously approved biologic products,103 a period that may extend beyond
the expiration of relevant patents.
The United States in 2010 enacted a new regulatory approval pathway for biologic
products that are “biosimilar” to or “interchangeable” with previously licensed biologic
products, after a 12-year period of regulatory exclusivity for the reference products.
Some critics have argued that the 12-year period of exclusivity is excessive (Engelberg et
al. 2009; FTC 2009b). Others contend that it is necessary to compensate for deficiencies
in patents (Higgins and Graham 2009) and have argued for even longer periods
(Grabowski 2008). This section sets aside the complex empirical question of the proper
duration of exclusivity and focuses on the structure of the statutory regime, evaluating its
provisions in light of the analysis of prior regulatory exclusivity regimes set forth
previously.
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Disentangling Regulatory Exclusivity From Patent Protection
A significant improvement over the Hatch-Waxman regime in the biosimilars legislation is
that it goes far toward disentangling regulatory exclusivity from patent protection.
Whereas under the Hatch-Waxman Act the dates when an ANDA may be filed or approved
turn in part on the expiration dates of patents listed in the Orange Book for the listed
product and on the status of litigation between the parties regarding those patents, these
dates are fixed for biosimilars: irrespective of patents, an application for a biosimilar
license may not be filed for four years, and its approval may not be made effective for 12
years, after the first licensing of the reference product.104 The FDA is not charged with
maintaining an archive of relevant patents in the Orange Book. Instead, a complex set of
provisions direct the parties to exchange confidential information relevant to potential
patent infringement litigation directly with each other and to negotiate over the scope of
such litigation.105 The FDA receives notice and a copy of the complaint in any patent
infringement action and publishes such notice in the Federal Register,106 but there is no
provision for the FDA to enter a stay of regulatory approval of the biosimilar license
pending resolution of the litigation. Instead, the biosimilar applicant must give notice to
the reference product sponsor 180 days before first commercial marketing of its product,
allowing the reference product sponsor to seek relief from the court in an infringement
action.107
This approach has a number of advantages over the Hatch-Waxman regime. It
does not put the FDA in the role of patent enforcer but leaves this task to the courts.
Innovators thus have no incentive to list dubious patents in the Orange Book to obtain a
30-month stay of regulatory approval from an agency that is unwilling to evaluate patent
claims. Remedies for infringement follow adjudication in the courts rather than arising
automatically at the outset based on the patent holder's allegations. The timing and
duration of regulatory exclusivity are certain and do not depend on the vicissitudes of
either infringement litigation or regulatory lag times (unless regulatory approval takes
longer than the eight years between the date when an application may be filed and the
date when its license may become effective).
(p. 190)

Supplemental Exclusivity
In contrast to the Hatch-Waxman Act, which affords three years of supplemental
exclusivity after FDA approval of a supplement to an NDA that required further clinical
trials, the biosimilars legislation does not offer additional periods of exclusivity for minor
product changes requiring further clinical trials to obtain supplemental approval. An
important exception is made for “a modification to the structure of the biological product”
that results “in a change in safety, purity, or potency.”108 Such a modification gets its own
full 12-year period of regulatory exclusivity. Moreover, the legislation adds six months of
“pediatric exclusivity” both to the four-year period before an application for a biosimilar
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license may be filed and to the 12-year period before the license may become effective,
under the same conditions applicable to pediatric exclusivity for drugs.109
The different approach to supplemental exclusivity in biosimilars legislation may reflect
the limited value that biopharmaceutical innovators have found in the supplemental
exclusivity conferred under the Hatch-Waxman Act.110 Although that Act nominally
awards three years of additional exclusivity for supplemental approvals for changes such
as new indications, the terms of exclusivity are limited to the terms of the supplemental
approval, allowing approval of competing products for the old indications. If supplemental
exclusivity does not defer FDA approval of the same product for other indications, the
generic product will inevitably be substituted when the reference product is prescribed
for the new indication. Perhaps there are no comparable rights in the new legislation
because nobody bothered to ask for them.
On the other hand, if the supplemental approval is for a structural change to the product
that changes its safety, purity, or potency, generic substitution is unlikely, and additional
exclusivity is likely to be valuable. In these circumstances, (p. 191) the new legislation not
only provides exclusivity but expands it to the full 12-year term given for new products.
This approach may both overreward structural changes and undermotivate other changes
that require investments in clinical trials. A better approach might be to emulate the
European system by conferring an additional period of exclusivity for conducting trials of
new indications of a product after initial market approval. Such trials provide better
information to guide the use of existing products, rather than distorting innovation
incentives in favor of structural changes. Regrettably, the US biosimilars legislation does
nothing to promote this valuable form of incremental innovation.

Limits of Abbreviation in Approval Pathway for Biosimilars
The biosimilars legislation does less to lower the regulatory entry barrier to follow-on
competition for biologics than the Hatch-Waxman Act did for generic versions of smallmolecule drugs. Although an applicant need not make the showing required for an ANDA
that the active ingredient is “the same” as that of the listed drug, it must demonstrate
that its product is “biosimilar to a reference product” based on data derived from
analytical studies, animal studies, and one or more clinical studies “that are sufficient to
demonstrate safety, purity, and potency” in a use for which the reference product is
licensed, unless the FDA determines that one of these elements is unnecessary.111
Although a showing of “biosimilarity” is sufficient to obtain a biologics license for the
follow-on product, a more extensive showing is necessary to get an agency determination
that the biosimilar product is “interchangeable” with the reference product.112 A
determination of interchangeability requires information showing that the biosimilar
product “can be expected to produce the same clinical result as the reference product in
any given patient” and, for products administered more than once, that “the risk in terms
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of safety or diminished efficacy of alternating or switching between use of the biologic
product and the reference product is not greater than the risk of using the reference
product without such alternation or switch.”113
Without a determination of interchangeability, investments in marketing may be
necessary to get physicians and pharmacists to switch their patients from the reference
product to the biosimilar product. Moreover, products that are merely “biosimilar” but
not “interchangeable” might not trigger generic substitution by pharmacists under state
laws (Grabowski and Vernon 1979). By contrast, a determi (p. 192) nation of
“bioequivalence” for a generic drug under an ANDA is enough to permit or even compel
pharmacists to substitute the less expensive generic version unless the physician directs
otherwise (Engelberg et al. 2009). Because most biologics are infusions that are
dispensed by physicians in their offices, rather than by pharmacists, substitution of
biosimilars will depend more on incentives and decisions of physicians than on those of
pharmacists.
It is unclear at this point how much it will cost to show biosimilarity and
interchangeability to the satisfaction of the FDA, but informed observers expect that the
costs will be considerably higher than what is incurred to show bioequivalence in an
ANDA. An FTC report estimates that it will take 8 to 10 years to develop a follow-on
biologic, at a cost between $100 million and $200 million, compared with three to five
years at a cost of $1 million to $5 million to develop a generic small-molecule drug (FTC
2009b). PhRMA estimated the cost of developing a biosimilar at a more modest $10 to
$40 million (Wheadon 2010). Either way, it is clear that the regulatory entry barrier for
follow-on biologics will remain much higher than that facing manufacturers of generic
drugs. Moreover, further marketing costs may be necessary to persuade physicians,
pharmacists, and payers to switch to these products. This may in part be an inevitable
consequence of differences between drugs and biologics, but it is also now in part a
function of deliberate legislative policy.

Exclusivity for Follow-on Products
The first follow-on product to receive a determination of interchangeability is entitled to a
period of exclusivity before the FDA will make a determination of interchangeability for a
competing product.114 A biosimilarity determination is not enough to trigger exclusivity
for the follow-on product, and exclusivity for the first product determined to be
interchangeable with a reference product does not preclude licensure of a competing
product that is determined to be merely biosimilar to the reference product but not
interchangeable with it. Follow-on exclusivity ends at the earlier of one year after first
commercial marketing,115 18 months after a final court decision in a patent infringement
action against the applicant or dismissal of such an action,116 42 months after approval if
the applicant has been sued and the litigation is still ongoing,117 or 18 months after
approval if the applicant has not been sued.118
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This provision corrects some of the design flaws that have come to light in the provision
for generic exclusivity in the Hatch-Waxman Act (some of which were (p. 193) fixed in
subsequent amendments). Rather than encouraging litigation by rewarding the first
applicant to challenge a patent, the proposal rewards the first applicant to receive a
determination of interchangeability. This encourages applicants to make the more
difficult showing of interchangeability in addition to biosimilarity, and it encourages
alacrity in securing a license from the FDA rather than promising rights on the basis of
application filing dates. Moreover, the proposal limits the duration of exclusivity in ways
that may not be avoided by delays in marketing, litigation, or settlement agreements.
On the other hand, it remains to be seen whether the exclusivity for follow-on biologics
will prove as valuable as Hatch-Waxman generic exclusivity. Although the periods of
exclusivity appear longer under the biologics legislation than the 180 days provided
under the Hatch-Waxman Act, other follow-on products may obtain licenses during the
exclusivity period based on a showing of biosimilarity to the reference product,
potentially eroding sales and profits for the first interchangeable product. As a result,
incentives to introduce follow-on biologics may be limited.

Why Regulatory Exclusivity Rather than
Patents?
One might ask whether it makes sense to provide protection against competition in
pharmaceutical markets through regulatory exclusivity rather than through patent law
(Thomas 2010). Economic incentives for R&D are traditionally the province of the patent
system and arguably outside the core competence of drug regulators in protecting health.
If patents are failing to provide the exclusivity necessary to promote pharmaceutical
R&D, might it make more sense to fix the patent system than to fortify regulatory
exclusivity?
It is not easy to fix the patent system to meet the particular needs of any one industry.
The patent system is a one-size-fits-all legal regime that applies essentially the same rules
to inventions arising in biopharmaceutical research, automotive engineering, information
technology, semiconductors, rocket science, and even business methods, although the
needs of these fields for patent protection differ greatly (Cohen et al. 2000). It is difficult
to fine-tune the patent laws to meet the needs of the pharmaceutical industry without
upsetting the balance of protection and competition in other industries.119 US patent law
has some industry-specific provisions, including the Hatch-Waxman patent term extension
pro (p. 194) visions.120 But there are limits to how far these provisions can go before they
put the United States in violation of the TRIPS Agreement, which requires signatories to
provide patent protection “without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced”121 (Dinwoodie and
Dreyfuss 2007). The patent law doctrines that have proved problematic for the
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pharmaceutical industry, such as the novelty and nonobviousness requirements, are not
minor details but bedrock principles. The pharmaceutical industry favored the prohibition
in the TRIPS Agreement against discrimination as to field of technology because it would
require member states to eliminate national laws that weakened drug patents (such as
compulsory licensing provisions) (Weissman 1996). But the treaty language seems to
prohibit discrimination in favor of drug patents as well as against them. Regulatory
exclusivity may offer a way around these legal and political problems.
Enhanced regulatory exclusivity offers other advantages over stronger patent protection.
First, drug regulators enforce regulatory exclusivity without the need for owners to bring
costly and risky infringement actions. This may be particularly advantageous in countries
that do not have well-functioning institutions for patent enforcement, but even in the
United States the costs and risks of infringement litigation are considerable. Second,
regulatory exclusivity may rest on more solid legal ground than patent protection. The
risks of invalidity are considerable for many drug patents, especially for follow-on patents
that face considerable prior art. Third, apart from its more limited duration, regulatory
exclusivity is a better temporal fit with the life cycle of a pharmaceutical product.
Regulatory exclusivity periods typically do not begin until a product is on the market,
whereas much or all of a patent term may run before that time. Finally, the scope of
regulatory exclusivity generally corresponds better to relevant product markets than do
patents. Regulatory exclusivity tracks the terms of regulatory product approvals, whereas
patent claims, drafted to distinguish an invention from the prior art, may correspond less
closely to any actual commercial product.
From a political economy perspective, it may be easier for interest groups to influence
policy initiatives that focus narrowly on a particular industry (e.g., modifications in drug
regulation) than to influence policy initiatives that have a broader impact (e.g.,
modifications in patent law), because the broader the implications of the policy, the more
likely they are to encounter competition from other interest groups. The pharmaceutical
industry has sometimes found itself in opposition to the financial services and information
technology industries, for example, in legislative debates about patent law reform (Kahin
2007). On the other hand, the biopharmaceutical industry was quite successful in shaping
the terms of recent biosimilars legislation to secure generous benefits for its members
(Greenwood 2010). Perhaps an industry-specific approach increases the risk that policy
makers will be (p. 195) unduly influenced by industry rent-seeking to the detriment of
other interests that are less vigorously represented in policy debates (Landes and Posner
2004).
On the other hand, the laws conferring regulatory exclusivity might prove to be less
durable than the patent laws. It is politically and legally difficult to change the patent
system, particularly in the post-TRIPS era, but there are many levers to push in the drug
regulation system to either enhance or chip away at the regulatory exclusivity that
supports drug prices. If legislatures and regulators have more latitude to change the
rules governing regulatory exclusivity, those rules may be more vulnerable to shifting
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political currents, leading to loss of protection when the public is more concerned with
controlling the costs of drugs and to increased protection when industry has greater
political influence.

Conclusion
The current overlapping legal protections for exclusivity in the pharmaceutical
marketplace reflect a series of political compromises, repeatedly renegotiated to correct
for unintended consequences in the previous version of the rules. Patents and patent
challenges play a central role in this system of protection, and many of the patents at
stake are ultimately held invalid in litigation. It is not easy to untangle a complex legal
regime that allocates billions of dollars of profits. But it makes little sense for lawmakers
and trade negotiators to extend this Byzantine system into new legal regimes, either by
duplicating the Hatch-Waxman Act for biosimilars or by binding US trading partners to
adopt similar systems in their national laws. A simpler and more effective legal regime
would rely less on patent protection and more on well-designed regulatory exclusivity to
support incentives for new drug development. Recent biosimilars legislation in the United
States, although controversial in specifics, corrects some problematic structural features
of the Hatch-Waxman Act, disentangling regulatory exclusivity from patents and offering
greater incentives to develop products that may be inadequately protected by a patent
system that is often asynchronous with biopharmaceutical product development.
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(1.) Codified as amended at 21 U.S. Code § 301 et seq.
(2.) Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983).
(3.) Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
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(4.) Codified as amended at 42 U.S. Code § 262 et seq.
(5.) Some hormone products have been regulated as drugs rather than biologics, allowing
for the possible approval of follow-on products under a less used regulatory approval
pathway codified at 21 U.S. Code § 505(b)(2) (Dinh 2007).
(6.) The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, signed into law as Title
VII, Subtitle A, §§ 7001-03 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148 (H.R. 3590) (2010), permits the use of an abbreviated pathway for a biological
product that is “biosimilar” to a previously licensed biological product after a 12-year
period following initial approval of the reference product.
(7.) Patents are national in scope, although international treaties have brought about
some degree of harmonization in the patent laws of member nations. See, for example,
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27trips.pdf (accessed November 2011) (hereinafter TRIPS Agreement).
(8.) 35 U.S. Code § 102.
(9.) 35 U.S. Code §§ 101, 112.
(10.) 35 U.S. Code § 103.
(11.) 35 U.S. Code § 112.
(12.) 35 U.S. Code §§ 131, 132.
(13.) A patent may be invalidated by the Patent and Trademark Office following
reexamination, 35 U.S. Code §§ 301-318, or by a court in an infringement action, 35 U.S.
Code §§ 281-282. Under § 6 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29 (H.R.
1249) (2011) [hereinafter “the America Invents Act”], beginning September 16, 2012,
third parties will be able to petition the Patent and Trademark Office to cancel claims of a
patent as unpatentable in a post-grant review proceeding within nine months of the date
the patent is issued or reissued. 35 U.S. Code § 321-329.
(14.) 35 U.S. Code §§ 102, 103.
(15.) 35 U.S. Code § 102(b). Under the rules in effect as of this writing, a patent applicant
has a one-year grace period within which to file a patent application after the invention is
disclosed or made obvious by a patent, printed publication, public use, or sale of the
invention. For patent claims with effective filing dates after March 16, 2013, this grace
period is only available for disclosures by the inventor, disclosures by someone who
obtained the subject matter from the inventor, and disclosures by others after public
disclosure by the inventor. 35 U.S. Code § 102(b)(1).
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(16.) 35 U.S. Code § 101.
(17.) 35 U.S. Code § 112.
(18.) Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966) (patent application claiming a method
of making a novel steroid did not satisfy the utility standard of showing “specific benefit
… in currently available form” where the steroid produced by the method was useful only
as “an object of scientific research”).
(19.) In Re: Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reversing rejection for lack of utility of a
patent application claiming a compound that showed antitumor activity in vitro).
(20.) See Rasmusson v. Smithkline Beecham, 413 F.3d 1318, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(21.) Most patent applications are published 18 months after their filing dates. See 35
U.S. Code § 122(b).
(22.) In Re: Papesch, 315 F.2d 381 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
(23.) In Re: Dillon, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
(24.) Knoll Pharmaceutical Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., 367 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
(25.) 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
(26.) Merck v. Teva, 395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (weekly rather than daily
administration of biphosphonates).
(27.) Alza v. Mylan, 464 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (timed-release formulation of
oxybutynin).
(28.) For example, McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. L. Perrigo Co., 337 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(combination of antidiarrheal compounds and simethicone to treat accompanying
flatulence); Richardson-Vicks v. Upjohn, 122 F.3d 1476, 44 USPQ2d (BNA) 1181 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (combination of ibuprofen and pseudoephedrine). But see Knoll Pharmaceutical Co.
v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1957 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (upholding validity of
patent on combination of hydrocodone and ibuprofen based on data from trials after the
patent grant showing surprising properties).
(29.) For example, Aventis Pharma Deutschland v. Lupin, 499 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(ramipril).
(30.) 35 U.S. Code § 271(e)(1).
(31.) Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
(32.) 35 U.S. Code § 154.
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(33.) Uruguay Round Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4814 (1994).
(34.) See supra note 7.
(35.) 35 U.S. Code § 154 (c)(1).
(36.) A continuation is a patent application that relies on the filing date and disclosure of
an older patent application (called a “parent”) that has not yet been issued or abandoned.
35 U.S. Code § 120. A continuation may add new claims but may not add new matter to
the disclosure without losing the benefit of the earlier filing date. Agilent Technologies v.
Affymetrix, 567 F.3d 1366, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In 2007, the PTO sought to limit the use
of multiple continuations by administrative rule. 72 Fed. Reg. 46716 (Aug. 21, 2007),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/72fr46716.pdf (accessed
November 2011). A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the
authority of the PTO to implement the rule, Tafas v. Dudas, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2009), but this decision was vacated and the appeal reinstated pursuant to a grant of
rehearing en banc (i.e., by the full court). 328 Fed. Appx. 658; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS
14611; 91 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
(37.) For example, see Takeda Pharmaceutical v. Doll, 531 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(considering challenge to validity of manufacturing process for cephem compounds
claiming priority from 1974 filing date).
(38.) Geneva v. GlaxoSmithKline, 349 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In Re: Metoprolol
Succinate Patent Litigation (Fed. Cir. 2007).
(39.) See PTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1.321, 37 C.F.R. § 1.321,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/consolidated_rules.pdf (accessed
November 2011).
(40.) For example, see Amgen v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 20409 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); Proctor & Gamble v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, 566 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
Pfizer v Teva Pharmaceuticals, 518 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
(41.) 35 U.S. Code § 156.
(42.) 35 U.S. Code §§ 156 (c), (g)(1)(B), (g)(6).
(43.) 35 U.S. Code § 156(c) (2). The relevant dates are determined by the FDA, and on the
basis of those dates the PTO extends the term of the patent. Astra v. Lehman, 71 F. 3d
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
(44.) 35 U.S. Code § 156(c)(1).
(45.) Fisons v. Quigg, 876 F.2d 99 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
(46.) 35 U.S. Code § 156(a)(1).
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(47.) 35 U.S. Code § 156(a).
(48.) For example, see SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
invalidating the patent on crystalline paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate (PHC
hemihydrate). PHC was first approved by the FDA in hemihydrous form in 1992, but the
prior art included a patent on PHC in anhydrous form from the 1970s.
(49.) Sometimes generic products were approved without new trials on the basis of
published literature under a “paper NDA.” 45 Fed. Reg. 82060 (Dec. 12, 1980). Questions
about the legality and reach of this mechanism were part of the impetus for the HatchWaxman Act (Engelberg 1999). Although the FDCA now provides for approval of paper
NDAs at § 505(b)(2), 21 U.S. Code § 355(b)(2), the significance of this approval pathway
has until recently been largely eclipsed by ANDAs. The language of the provision is quite
broad, however, and the FDA has interpreted it to allow approval of a drug that is similar
but not identical to a previously approved product based in part on previous unpublished
studies that the applicant neither conducted nor obtained the right to use (Dinh 2007).
(50.) 35 U.S. Code § 271.
(51.) An ANDA does not require full reports of clinical trials to show safety and efficacy so
long as the conditions of use, active ingredients, route of administration, and strength are
the same as a previously approved “listed product,” the ANDA product is “bioequivalent”
to the listed product, and the labeling of the two products is the same. 21 U.S. Code §
355(j)(2).
(52.) 21 U.S. Code § 355(b)(1).
(53.) FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Approved Products With Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations (commonly known as the Orange Book), available at http://
www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm (accessed November 2011).
(54.) 21 U.S. Code § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). If the patent covers a method of use for which the
ANDA applicant does not seek approval, it may instead include a statement to that effect,
known as a “section viii statement.” 21 U.S. Code § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).
(55.) 21 U.S. Code §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(1), (2), (3), (4).
(56.) 21 U.S. Code § 355(j)(5)(B)(i).
(57.) Nonpatent grounds for rejecting an ANDA are set forth at 21 U.S. Code § 355(j)(4)
(A)-(K).
(58.) 21 U.S. Code § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii).
(59.) 21 U.S. Code §§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), 505(j)(2)(B).
(60.) 21 U.S. Code § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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(61.) 21 U.S. Code § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
(62.) Before a court will enter a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show (1) a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if an injunction is not
granted; (3) a balance of hardships tipping in its favor; and (4) favorable impact of the
injunction on the public interest. Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, 239 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
(63.) 35 C.F.R. § 314.53(a), (f). The courts have upheld the FDA's position that it has no
duty to screen Orange Book submissions. Apotex v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. v. Thompson, 354 F.3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In 2003
Congress amended the statute to permit counterclaims seeking to delist improperly listed
patents in ANDA infringement litigation. 21 U.S. Code § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii). But a first filer of
an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification may object to the delisting of a patent if
delisting would deprive the firm of the 180-day period of generic exclusivity. See Ranbaxy
Laboratories v. Leav.itt, 469 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
(64.) Pub. L. No. 108-173 §§ 1101, 1102 (enacted December 8, 2003) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S. code §§ 355(j)(2) and (5)).
(65.) The new statutory language is codified at 21 U.S. Code § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
(66.) The earliest permissible filing date for an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification is
four years after initial approval of the NDA. 21 U.S. Code § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii). If an
infringement action is commenced within one year of such a filing, the 30-month stay is
extended if necessary so that it expires 71/2 years after initial approval of the NDA.
(67.) 21 U.S. Code § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
(68.) The permissible filing dates for ANDAs are limited not only by patents but also by
the periods of regulatory exclusivity discussed later. In the case of a new chemical entity,
the earliest date that an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification may be filed is four years
after approval of the NDA. 21 U.S. Code § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).
(69.) 21 U.S. Code §505(j)(5)(C)(i). See Teva Pharmaceuticals USA v Novartis, 482 F.3d
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
(70.) Shortly before passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit held that the use of a patented drug in clinical trials was an act of patent
infringement. Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical, 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The
Hatch-Waxman Act changed this rule to allow clinical trials and bioequivalence studies
during the patent term, thereby facilitating generic entry immediately upon patent
expiration. 35 U.S. Code § 271(e)(1). See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
(71.) 35 U.S. Code § 271(e)(2), (3).

Patents and Regulatory Exclusivity
(72.) Bayer AG v. Elan, 212 F.3d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (ANDA that specified product
having crystals with specific surface area [SSA] falling outside scope of patent claims did
not infringe patent, even though measured SSA for sample “biobatch” of product
produced by the ANDA filer's supplier fell within scope of claims).
(73.) Warner-Lambert v. Apotex, 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (ANDA that sought
approval to market generic only for previously approved uses not covered by patent did
not infringe patent on additional unapproved uses of product).
(74.) This might occur if the 30-month stay on ANDA approval expires and the challenger
opts for “at-risk launch” or if the court holds that the patent is invalid or not infringed by
the ANDA product. 21 U.S. Code §355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
(75.) For example, Bayer AG v. Biovail, 279 F. 3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (infringement
action against a commercial product still available to patent holder even though ANDA
product had been held not to infringe in prior ANDA litigation).
(76.) A generic challenger may decide to launch its product commercially before the
litigation is finally resolved on appeal. This so-called “at-risk launch” puts the generic at
risk of damages liability if it is held liable as an infringer (Curtiss 2008).
(77.) The Hatch-Waxman Act specified the remedies available for ANDA infringement as
deferral of the effective date of approval of the ANDA until after expiration of the patent;
injunctive relief against commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell, sale, or importation;
and damages only for such commercial acts. 35 U.S. Code § 271(e)(4). Attorney's fees may
also be available in exceptional cases. Id.
(78.) Subsequent ANDA filers will not be entitled to the 180 days of generic exclusivity
and will therefore be less motivated to incur litigation costs, but other ANDA filers with
the same filing date could share generic exclusivity.
(79.) Multiple ANDA filers may share the 180-day period of generic exclusivity if each
files a complete application with a paragraph IV certification on the same date and no
previously filed ANDA for the same drug included a paragraph IV certification. 21 U.S.
Code § 505(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I), (II)(bb). For blockbuster products, such multiple filings are
common on the first date that they are allowed, four years after approval of the NDA. (j)
(5)(F)(ii). (FDA Center for Drug Evaluation 2003a). Available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm072851.pdf
(accessed November 2011).
(80.) An “authorized generic” is a product that is marketed and priced as a generic but
sold under the authority of the holder of the NDA rather than under an ANDA. The courts
have sustained the legality of authorized generics. See Teva Pharmaceuticals v. Crawford,
410 F.3d 51, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Authorized generics increase competition during the
period of generic exclusivity and thereby reduce prices to consumers, but the long-term
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effects may be more ambiguous if authorized generics undermine incentives to challenge
drug patents by filing paragraph IV certifications (FTC, 2009a).
(81.) Specifically, the revised statute allows multiple ANDA filers on the same date to
share the 180-day exclusivity, 21 U.S. Code § 505(J)(5)(B)(iv)(I), (II); redefines the trigger
that begins the 180-day period to be the first commercial marketing by any of the first
ANDA filers, including an “authorized generic,” 21 U.S. Code § 505(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I); and
provides for forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity period if an applicant fails to market the
drug within specified periods, withdraws the application, amends the certification, fails to
obtain tentative approval for the ANDA, or enters into an agreement that is adjudicated
to be in violation of the antitrust laws, or if the relevant patents expire. See 21 U.S. Code
§ 505(j)(5)(D).
(82.) According to a 2002 FTC report, 73 percent of ANDA infringement cases result in
invalidity when resolved by the courts, suggesting that consumers might be better off if
these cases were litigated rather than settled (FTC 2002).
(83.) For example, In Re: Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (no antitrust violation), cert denied sub nom. Ark. Carpenters Health &
Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 174 L. Ed. 2d 553 (2009); In Re: Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litigation, 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (no antitrust violation), cert. denied sub nom.
Joblove v. Barr Labs, 127 S. Ct. 3001 (2007); Schering-Plough v. FTC, 402 F.2d 1056 (11th
Cir. 2005) (no antitrust violation), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006). But see In Re:
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (per se antitrust violation),
cert. denied sub nom. Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 543 U.S. 939, 125 S. Ct. 307
(2004).
(84.) See supra note 81.
(85.) Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Title XI, §
1112 et seq. A summary of these provisions is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2004/01/040106pharmrules.pdf (accessed November 2011).
(86.) Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049.
(87.) Under § 527 of the FDCA, if the FDA approves a new drug application for a drug
that it has designated for a rare disease or condition, “the Secretary may not approve
another application … for such drug for such disease or condition for a person who is not
the holder of such approved application … until the expiration of seven years from the
date of the approval of the approved application ….” 21 U.S. Code § 360cc(a).
(88.) Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301 (D.D.C. 1987); Sigma-Tau Pharms. v.
Schwetz, 288 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2002).
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(89.) 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(13)(i), (ii). See Berlex v. FDA, 942 F. Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1996)
(upholding approval of competing beta interferon before end of exclusivity period based
on clinical superiority).
(90.) Sigma-Tau Pharms. v. Schwetz, 288 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2002).
(91.) 21 U.S. Code § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).
(92.) 21 U.S. Code § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii).
(93.) 21 U.S. Code § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).
(94.) 21 U.S. Code § 355(j)(5)(F)(iv).
(95.) Upjohn v. Kessler, 938 F. Supp. 439 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
(96.) Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
(97.) Pub. L. No. 105-115,111 Stat. 2296. Although this provision was originally set to
expire after five years, Congress has extended it twice. See Best Pharmaceuticals for
Children Act of 2002, P.L. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (codified as amended in scattered
provisions of Titles 21 and 42 of U.S. Code); Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of
2007, Title V of Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, P.L. 110-85, 121
Stat. 823, 876 (codified at 21 U.S. Code § 355a).
(98.) See 21 U.S. Code § 355a.
(99.) FDCA § 505A(n), 21 U.S. Code § 355a(n).
(100.) Council Directive 87/21/EEC of 22 December 1986, amending Directive 65/65/EEC
on the Approximation of Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation, or Administrative
Action Relating to Proprietary Medicinal Products. Available at http://ikev.org/docs/eu/
387L0021.htm (accessed December 22, 2011).
(101.) Council Directive 2004/27/EC of 31 March 2004 amending Directive 2001/83/EC
on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use. Available at http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:136:0034:0057:EN:PDF
(accessed November 2011).
(102.) TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, Article 39.3.
(103.) See supra note 6.
(104.) Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, supra note 6, § 7002 (a)(2), to be
codified in pertinent part at 42 U.S. Code 262(k)(7)(A) and (B).
(105.) Id. § 7002(a)(2)., to be codified at 42 U.S. Code § 262(l).
(106.) Id., to be codified at 42 U.S. Code § 262(l)(6)(C).
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(107.) Id., to be codified at 42 U.S. Code § 262(l)(8).
(108.) Id., to be codified at 42 U.S. Code § 262(k)(7)(C)(ii)(I),(II).
(109.) Id. § 7002(g)(1), to be codified at 42 U.S. Code § 262(m).
(110.) See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
(111.) Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, supra note 6, § 7002 (a)(2), to be
codified at 42 U.S. Code § 262(k)(2)(A)(i), (ii).
(112.) Id., to be codified at 42 U.S. Code § 262(k)(2)(B), (k)(4).
(113.) Id., to be codified at 42 U.S. Code § 262(k)(4).
(114.) Id., to be codified at 42 U.S. Code § 262(k)(6).
(115.) Id., to be codified at 42 U.S. Code § 262(k)(6)(A).
(116.) Id., to be codified at 42 U.S. Code § 262(k)(6)(B).
(117.) Id., to be codified at 42 U.S. Code § 262(k)(6)(C)(i).
(118.) Id., to be codified at 42 U.S. Code § 262 (k)(6)(C)(ii).
(119.) But see Burk and Lemley, 2009 (arguing that courts can apply patent law
differently in different industries according to their particular needs).
(120.) 35 U.S. Code § 156.
(121.) TRIPS Agreement, supra note7, at art. 27 (emphasis added).
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